Join us for a talk by Dr. Peter Rosendorff, Associate Professor, Department of Politics, New York University

Monday, March 1, 2010
12:30 PM - 2:00 PM
Bunche Hall, Room 4357
Los Angeles, CA 90095

About the Speaker

Professor Rosendorff teaches courses in international political economy including international trade theory and policy, the economics of trade and monetary policy, and the politics of the world economy. Professor Rosendorff's research examines the linkages between domestic politics and institutions and international economic policy. His published work in the political economy of trade policy brings the methods of inquiry of modern economics to questions more traditionally posed by many IR scholars.

HONORS, AWARDS AND RESEARCH FUNDING

• College Faculty Development Awards, University of Southern California 1999 - 2005
• Principal Investigator, National Science Foundation, 1997-1998.
• Fellow, College Award for Research Excellence, University of Southern California, 1997-1998 and 2001-2002.
• Fellow, Zumberge Faculty Research and Innovation Fund, University of Southern California, 1993-1995 and 1999-2001.
• Ph.D. Awarded with Distinction, Columbia University, 1993.
• Research Fellow, Center for the Social Sciences, Columbia University, 1989-1992.
• President's Fellow, Columbia University, 1986-1989.
• Senior Bursar, University of the Witwatersrand, 1984-1985.
• Bursar, Human Sciences Research Council, Johannesburg, South Africa, 1984-1985.

JOURNAL ARTICLES 

• Rosendorff, B. Peter and Charles M. Cameron, "A Signaling Theory of Congressional Oversight," Games and Economic Behavior, 1993, 5:44-70.
• Rosendorff, B. Peter, "Voluntary Export Restraints, Anti-Dumping Procedure and Domestic Politics", American Economic Review, 1996, 86(3): 544-561.
• Milner, Helen and B. Peter Rosendorff, "Trade Negotiations, Information and Domestic Politics: The Role of Domestic Groups." Economics and Politics, 1996, 8(2): 145-189.
• Milner, Helen and B. Peter Rosendorff, "Democratic Politics and International trade Negotiations: Elections and Divided Government as
• Constraints on Trade Liberalization," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1997, 41(1): 117-147.
• Mansfield, Edward, Helen Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff, "Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies and International Trade Negotiations," American Political Science Review, 2000, 94(2): 305-322.
• Rosendorff, B. Peter, "Choosing Democracy," Economics and Politics, 2001, 13(1): 1-29.
• B. Peter Rosendorff and Helen Milner, "The Optimal Design of International Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape," International Organization, 2001, 55(4): 829-857.
• Mansfield, Edward, Helen Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff, "Replication, Realism, and Robustness: Analyzing Political Regimes and International Trade", American Political Science Review, 2002, 96(1):167-69.
• Mansfield, Edward, Helen Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff, "Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements," International Organization, 2002, 56(3):477-514.
• Rosendorff, B. Peter and Todd Sandler, "Too Much of a Good Thing? The Proactive Response Dilemma", Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming.

EDUCATION

• Ph.D. (Economics, with Distinction), Columbia University, New York
• M.Phil., Economics, Columbia University
• M.A. Economics, Columbia University
• B.A. (Honours), Economics, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa
• B.Sc., Mathematics, University of the Witwatersrand.

Sponsor(s): Burkle Center for International Relations, Political Science