A talk by Lawrence Broz, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego. This event was co-sponsored by the UCLA Department of Political Science and part of the department's Comparative Pro-Seminar.
Despite the vast amount of research on bank-centered financial crises, surprisingly little attention has been given to the partisan character of government as a cause--and a consequence--of financial crises. Broz argues that policies and regulations vary predictably with the partisan character of the government, creating a "partisan-policy financial cycle" in which conservative, pro-market governments preside over financial booms while left-wing governments are elected to office after crashes.
Lawrence Broz teaches international political economy and international relations at the University of California, San Diego. Prior to joining the Department of Political Science at UCSD, Prof. Broz held professorships at Harvard University and New York University. He earned his PhD in political science at UCLA.
Broz’s current research focuses on the institutions of monetary and financial policymaking - central banks, exchange rate regimes, etc. – and the remarkable variations that exist across countries and have arisen over time. Broz's publications include International Origins of the Federal Reserve System (1997) and a number of articles in International Organization and other top journals.