Authoritarian Breakdown

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Although most human beings have lived under some form of authoritarianism throughout most of recorded history, the academic study of politics has focused on democracy. This focus may reflect the intellectual interests of the predominantly North American and West European scholars who built the discipline of political science, or it may be due to the greater transparency and routinization of democratic politics, which makes it easier to observe and to theorize. Whatever the reason, this focus has left us with few shoulders of giants on which to stand as we try to understand political change in less democratic and less institutionalized settings.¹

The study of regime transition is one of the areas in which the near absence of theories about authoritarian politics has impeded scholars’ ability to explain events. Since World War II, more than 125 authoritarian regimes have ended, as have many democracies. Many fine studies of these transitions have been written, but few of the general explanations proposed by scholars have turned out to hold across the full range of cases. One reason for the inability to develop a general explanation for transitions, I argue below, is that different forms of authoritarianism break down in characteristically different ways. As a consequence, explanations of transition developed in response to experiences in one part of the world, in which some particular kind of authoritarianism predominates, offer little leverage for explaining transitions in other regions where different forms of authoritarianism are more common. Without theories of authoritarian politics, we perceive these differences as simply more of the great sprawling complexity of political life, rather than as forming systematic and explicable patterns.

This study contributes to building theories of authoritarian politics. In it, I develop an argument about intra-elite competition within authoritarian regimes – the analogue of elections in democracies -- and then draw out some of the argument’s implications for the study of transitions. I test a hypothesis implied by this argument using a data set of information about nearly all post-

¹ Exceptions include the work of Douglass North (1981, 1989, 1990), Margaret Levi (1988), and others who have focused on the struggle between rulers and subjects over property rights and taxation. Juan Linz has long noted the very great differences among different forms of authoritarianism. More recently, Linz, Stepan, and others influenced by their work have tried to develop arguments linking characteristics of authoritarian rule to transition outcomes (Linz and Stepan 1996; Linz and Chehabi 1998; Snyder 1998).
1945 authoritarian regimes. One of the clearest findings to emerge from this analysis is that military governments contain inherent sources of fragility that make them far less durable than other kinds of authoritarianism. Consequently, they last less long and are more easily destabilized than are other types of dictatorship.

Past Research on Transitions

The literature on transitions suffers from an odd bifurcation. Only a couple of robust generalizations have emerged from it, and they both involve relationships between economic conditions and regime type. These findings are usually interpreted as implying a relationship between the interests of ordinary citizens and demand for types of political regime. Yet nearly all detailed descriptions of particular transitions and most efforts to theorize them focus on the interests, choices, and strategies of elite political actors. It is the propositions suggested in analyses of elite behavior that seem never to generalize very far beyond the cases they were developed to explain.\(^2\) Scholars seeking to take another step toward understanding transitions thus face two tasks: to develop general theories of elite behavior in different situations, and to articulate a more systematic understanding of the interaction between elite decisions and mass demands.

Perhaps the best established generalization about the effects of economic conditions on political systems is that people who live in wealthier countries are more likely to enjoy democratic government. The positive empirical relationship between democracy and economic development has been well established for some time (Jackman 1973, Bollen 1979), and it has been confirmed more recently in a series of very sophisticated statistical studies (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Londregan and Poole 1990 and 1996; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Przeworski et al. 2000). Londregan and Poole show that the strongest predictor of transitions to authoritarianism, whether from prior authoritarian or democratic regimes, is poverty. Przeworski and co-authors show that once democratization has occurred, it survives in countries above a certain level of economic development. Among countries below that threshold, the likelihood of a reversion to dictatorship increases with poverty. Earlier scholars saw the relationship between wealth and democracy as

\(^2\) See Geddes (1999) for a review of the transitions literature.
implying that increasing levels of economic development would lead citizens to demand democratic governance. Przeworski et al. (2000) argue convincingly, however, that the relationship is caused not by transitions to democracy in better off countries but rather by the absence of democratic breakdown in these countries.

A second finding is also reasonably well-established, namely, that poor short-term economic performance contributes to the downfall of dictatorships, just as it does to the breakdown of democracies and the defeat of incumbents in stable democracies. This finding, unlike the one above, has a standard interpretation: all governments require some support and even in those that permit no routine citizen input into leadership choice, those members of society whose support is needed to maintain leaders in power use a “retrospective voting” calculus in deciding whether to withdraw their support. Authoritarian governments may be insulated from the distress of ordinary citizens, but they must deliver benefits to their own, often restricted, group of supporters in order to survive in power. In the analysis below, I show that some kinds of authoritarianism are more dependent on economic performance than others.

In contrast to the quantitative studies of the relationship between development and democracy, most non-quantitative research on transitions from one regime type to another focuses not on the effect of economic conditions on the likelihood of democracy, but rather on the interests and strategies of regime and opposition elites and the constraints facing them. Until the early nineties, one of the most widely accepted generalizations about transitions was that “there is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence—direct or indirect—of important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself” (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986:19). Detailed case studies of several early Latin American transitions showed that the impetus for the first steps toward democratization could indeed be found within military governments. Greek experience followed the same pattern. Studies of the roots of transition in Spain and Portugal highlighted the factions within those regimes, though claims that these factions actually caused regime change were less persuasive. The transitions that followed the Soviet collapse, however, could not in

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3 Przeworski et al. (2000) understate the effect of economic performance on the survival of authoritarian regimes because they code authoritarian regimes that are followed by other authoritarian regimes as continuing to exist.
most cases be traced to splits within the old regime. Nor can most transitions in Africa. Instead, “transitions in Africa seem to be occurring more commonly from below….” (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 83). In short, transitions have occurred in different ways in different parts of the world.

If, instead of lumping all dictatorships together, we begin the study of transitions with a few ideas about normal political processes within different kinds of authoritarianism, we can understand why transitions differ. Military regimes such as those observed by O’Donnell and Schmitter do, as I show below, contain sources of internal fragility not shared by other types of authoritarianism.

Types of Authoritarianism

Different kinds of authoritarianism differ from each other as much as they differ from democracy. Their leaders emerge from different groups and via different selection processes. They rely on different segments of society for support. They have different procedures for making decisions, and different interest groups influence policies. Intra-elite factionalism and competition take different forms in different kinds of dictatorship, and consequently succession occurs in different ways. They deal with ordinary citizens and opposition in different ways. Because analysts have not studied these differences systematically, few have considered how different kinds of competition over succession and policy might affect the likelihood and mode of transition. These differences, however, cause different kinds of authoritarianism to break down in systematically different ways. Here I propose theoretical foundations for explaining some of the differences among types of authoritarianism.

In an effort to capture some of the most important differences among authoritarian regimes, I classify them as military, single-party, personalist, or amalgams of the pure types. In military regimes, a group of officers decides who will rule and influences policy. In single-party regimes, one party dominates access to political office and controls policy, though other parties may legally exist. In personalist regimes, access to office and the fruits of office depends on the discretion of an individual leader. This leader may wear a uniform and may have created a party to support

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4 See Geddes (2003) for criteria used in classifying regimes.
himself, but neither the military nor the party exercises independent decision-making power. The whims of the ruler prevail (cf. Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 61-96; Linz and Chehabi 1998: 4-45; Snyder 1998).

Factions, which occur in all kinds of government, tend to destabilize military regimes when conflict between them become intense. Consequently, transitions from military rule usually begin with splits within the ruling military elite, as noted by much of the literature on Latin American transitions from military rule. In contrast, rival factions within single-party and personalist regimes have stronger incentives to hold onto power despite their differences. Single-party regimes are quite resilient and tend to be brought down by exogenous events rather than competition over succession or policy disagreements (cf. Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Huntington 1991).

Personalist leaders do everything they can to repress factions. Personalist regimes tend to collapse in two situations: when the leader dies or becomes quite ill, as that undermines repressive capacity centralized in his hands; or when disastrous economic events prevent the distribution of benefits and profit opportunities to close supporters. Because they usually respond to opposition with repression rather than negotiation, personalist regimes are more likely to end in bloody upheaval of one kind or another than either of the other types of authoritarianism (cf. Huntington 1991).

These differences between military and other types of regime explain why observers of transitions in Africa and Eastern Europe usually find the beginnings of change outside the ruling clique rather than inside, as would have been expected by the analysts of the earlier transitions in Latin America. In the rest of this study, I elaborate these arguments and demonstrate that they are consistent with evidence.

To show why the breakdown of military regimes tends to start from within the officer corps but the breakdown of other forms of authoritarianism does not, I focus on rivalries and relationships within the ruling entity of authoritarian governments: the officer corps, dominant party, clique surrounding the ruler, or some combination of two or more of these. Most of the time, the greatest threat to the survival of the leader in office – as opposed to the survival of the regime itself -- comes from within this ruling group, not from outside opposition. In normal times, in other
words, most of what we would call politics, the struggle over office, spoils, and policy decisions, takes place within this ruling group. Thus understanding this struggle plays the same central role in understanding authoritarian politics that understanding elections does in democracies.

Politics within the ruling group tells only part of the story of regime change, but it is a part that has been understudied. Opposition from outside the ruling coalition and exogenous shocks, such as the Soviet collapse, the international economic crisis of the 1980s, and the International Monetary Fund-induced economic reforms that followed the crisis, have affected regime survival, sometimes decisively. By focusing on the political dynamics within different kinds of authoritarian regime, however, I aim to build the foundations for explaining when and how exogenous shocks and popular mobilization affect different kinds of regime and thus the likelihood of transition. Having a theoretical basis for understanding different kinds of authoritarian regimes would make it possible to move beyond the lists of causes-that-sometimes-matter often found in studies of transitions and toward systematic statements about when particular causes are likely to matter.

Theoretical Foundations

Standard theories of politics begin with two simplifying assumptions: politicians want to achieve office and remain there; the best strategy for surviving in office is to give those whose support is needed what they want. Much of the literature on democratic politics concerns how different political institutions affect the survival strategies of politicians. The analysis of transitions requires an analogous investigation of the effects of differences among authoritarian institutions, whether formal or informal. To begin this task, the plausibility of the standard assumptions about politics needs to be assessed and those assumptions possibly revised. Most obviously, in the absence of routine ways for citizens to remove leaders from office, questions of who exactly the supporters of authoritarian leaders are, how satisfied they have to be, and what factors besides satisfaction with regime performance affect their level of acquiescence require empirical investigation. These questions cannot be answered in the abstract or assumed away, as in the study of democratic politics. The identity and interests of regime supporters varies quite dramatically from one kind of authoritarianism to another.
Less obviously, it should not be assumed, for reasons shown below, that the officers, parties,
and cliques supporting authoritarian leaders always want to hold office or that, having achieved it,
they always want to hang onto it. One of the central arguments of this study is that military
officers, in contrast to cadres in single-party and personalist regimes, sometimes do not. If there
are circumstances in which they can achieve their primary goals better out of power than in, as I
will argue there are, then we cannot build theories of authoritarian politics that begin with the
standard assumptions.

What Military Officers Want

As research on the attitudes and preferences of military officers in many different societies
shows, officers in different countries come from different socioeconomic, ethnic, and educational
backgrounds. They feel sympathetic toward different societal groups, and they pursue different
ideologically motivated goals. No assumptions or generalizations can be made about the societal
interests or domestic policies they support. According to the scholarly consensus, however, most
professional officers place a higher value on the survival and effectiveness of the military itself
than on anything else (Janowitz 1960 and 1977; Finer 1975; Bienen 1978; DeCalo 1976).

This interest implies a concern with the maintenance of hierarchy, discipline, and unity within
the military; autonomy from civilian intervention with postings and promotions; and large budgets
to attract high-quality recruits and buy state-of-the-art weapons. Achieving these corporate goals
also increases the likelihood that officers can achieve their individual desires for high salaries and
predictable career advancement. Officers also value the territorial integrity of their nations and
internal order, but the effective pursuit of these goals requires unity, discipline, and adequate
supplies (Stepan 1971; Nordlinger 1977; Barros 1978). In countries in which joining the military
has become a regular path to personal enrichment (for example, Bolivia, Nigeria, Thailand,
Indonesia, and Congo during certain times), acquisitive motives can be assumed to rank high in
most officers’ preferences. They will be most important for some and second or third most
important for others, if only because the continued existence of lucrative opportunities for officers
may depend on the survival of the military as an effective organization. Where individual
acquisitive motives have swamped concern for corporate survival and effectiveness, however, the
professionalism of militaries deteriorates, and the officer corps is less likely to serve as a successful counterweight to ambitious political leaders.

Where corporate interests prevail, such preferences imply that officers agree to join coup conspiracies only if they believe that the civilian government prevents the achievement of their main goals, and that many, in fact, will only join if they believe that the military institution itself is threatened. These preferences are thus consistent with Stepan’s (1971) and Nordlinger’s (1977) observations about the importance of threats to the military as an institution in the decisions of officers to join coup conspiracies. As Nordlinger notes, most officers “would probably have much preferred to remain in the barracks if their objectives, particularly the defense or enhancement of the military’s corporate interests, could have been realized from that vantage point” (1977: 142).

The worst threat to the military as an institution is civil war in which one part of the armed forces fights another. Consequently, the most important concern for many officers in deciding whether to join a coup conspiracy is their assessment of how many other officers will join. What Nordlinger, Stepan, and others are describing resembles a classic Battle-of-the-Sexes game in which one member of a couple prefers going to a movie and the other prefers the symphony, but both would prefer doing something together to doing something alone. The best outcome for either one always depends on what the other chooses. For officers, the logic of decisions about seizing power or returning to the barracks is the same. Some officers hanker after political power and seize any excuse to intervene. Others have internalized legalist values that preclude intervention except in the most dire circumstances. Most have views that place them somewhere in between these extremes. Almost all, however, care most about the survival and effectiveness of the military, and thus they want the military to move either in or out of power as a cohesive whole.

Figure 1, Panel A depicts this set of preferences as a game. In the particular game shown, the majority prefers to remain in the barracks. The pay-offs for remaining in the barracks are shown in the lower right cell. The upper left cell shows the pay-offs for a successful intervention carried out by a united military. The minority is better off than it was in the barracks, but the majority is slightly worse off.
The minority would prefer to intervene, but would be far worse off if they initiated an unsuccessful intervention without support from the majority than if they remained unhappily in the barracks. (Pay-offs for this outcome are shown in the upper right cell.) Participants in an unsuccessful coup attempt face possible demotion, discharge, court martial, and execution for treason. The majority faction that opposed the coup is also damaged by the attempt, since the armed forces will have been weakened, and the government is likely to respond with greater oversight, reorganization, and interference with promotions and postings to try to insure greater future loyalty, all of which reduce military autonomy.

The final possible outcome is a successful coup carried out despite minority opposition. (Pay-offs are shown in the lower left cell.) In this event, the minority that remains loyal to the ousted civilian government is likely to face the same costs as unsuccessful conspirators: demotion, discharge, exile, prison, death. The plotters may achieve power, but a weakened military institution reduces their chances of keeping it. Future conspiracies supported by those demoted or discharged after the coup become more likely. Once factions of the military take up arms against each other, it takes years or decades to restore unity and trust.

This is a coordination game: once the military is either in power (upper left cell) or out of power (lower right cell), neither faction can improve its position unilaterally. Each faction must have the other’s cooperation in order to secure its preferred option. When the military is out of power, even if the majority comes to believe it should intervene, it cannot move to its preferred alternative without cooperation from the minority.

Where interventionists have broad public support, as in Brazil before the 1964 coup or Argentina before the 1976 coup, and democracy makes plotting relatively safe, extensive consultation among officers and between officers and civilian allies often precedes coups. Plotters may delay the seizure of power until the officer corps has reached consensus about the need for intervention and developed elaborate rules for consultation and leadership rotation. These consultations aim to insure the cooperation of all major factions in the intervention. Such
elaborate efforts to achieve consensus and hammer out post-intervention rules have been described by observers of a number of interventions.\(^5\)

Where those who favor intervention lack popular support or a more repressive political system raises the costs of plotting, plotters may choose a different strategy. Conspirators can keep the plot secret from all but a few key officers and hope that the rest will go along once key central institutions have been seized. The seizure of these institutions signals to the rest of the officer corps that an intervention has occurred. Often the presidential palace, garrisons in and around the capital city, radio and TV stations, the central telephone exchange, and the main airport will suffice to make this signal credible. Nordlinger (1977) identifies this strategy as most common in practice. It is a characteristic of games like Battle-of-the-Sexes that the actor who succeeds in credibly moving first can always get what he or she wants. The partner, for example, who announces, “I’ve bought tickets for the symphony Friday night. Do you want to come, or shall I ask someone else?” has made a credible first move. The couple will go to the symphony. The first-mover strategy fails when the first move is not credible; in the context of coup decisions, when most officers do not believe that most other officers will go along with the plotters.

The attempted Spanish coup in 1981 exemplifies a failed first mover strategy. Plotters believed that much of the officer corps would support an intervention, mostly because of the threat to national integrity posed by the democratic government’s willingness to negotiate with Basque and Catalan nationalists. The small group of active conspirators believed that once they had seized control of the Cortes and key installations in Madrid, the rest of the officer corps and King Juan Carlos would acquiesce in the coup. The evidence available suggests that most of the officer corps would have gone along if the king had not immediately begun telephoning the captains-general and other high ranking officers to inform them that he would resist the coup (Colomer 1995). For some officers, loyalty to the king was stronger than other values and led them to ally with the king. For others, the king’s unequivocal opposition indicated which position most other officers were likely to take, and this information led them to resist intervention in order to end up on the same side. The coup might well have succeeded if the king’s access to

\(^5\) For the 1964 Brazilian coup, see Stepan (1971); for the 1976 Argentine coup, see Fontana
telephones and television had been blocked and he had thus been unable to signal his opposition. Josep Colomer quotes one of the erstwhile conspirators as saying: “The next time, cut the King’s phone line!” (1995: 121).

When the military controls the government, their decision-making logic remains the same. Most officers will go along with a credible move by one faction back to the barracks. Strong disagreements among leading officers over how to respond to economic difficulties or which among them will next occupy the presidency lead to intense factionalization. When this happens, some officers are likely to prefer returning to the barracks as a way of avoiding institution-damaging conflict. Observers see splits in the officer corps at the time of the first moves toward democracy because the concern over divisions within the military causes some factions to prefer a return to the barracks. Both hardline and softline factions can use the first mover strategy, however. Military presidents are in an especially good position to make quite credible first moves heading back toward the barracks, and most officers will go along if they do. Hardliners can also chance first mover strategies, ousting more moderate military presidents. This carries more risk, but if the move is credible, again, most of the officer corps will go along.

For the officer who claws his way to the top of the post-coup junta, the game may change after a successful seizure of power, as it did for General Pinochet. Most other officers always see their situation as resembling a Battle-of-the-Sexes game, however, even in the most politicized and factionalized militaries. Repeated coups by different factions, as in Syria prior to 1970 or Benin (then called Dahomey) before 1972, would not be possible if most of the army did not go along with the first mover, either in seizing power or in handing it back to civilians.

Cadres in Single-Party Regimes

The preferences of cadres in dominant parties are much simpler than those of officers. Like democratic politicians, they want to hold office. Some value office because they want to control policy, some for the pure enjoyment of influence and power, and some for the illicit material gains that come with office in some countries. They value the survival and unity of their parties as contributors to their own survival in office, not as a means to other, more important ends.

(1987); for the 1973 Chilean coup, see Valenzuela (1978).
In the game between factions in a single party (shown in Panel B of Figure 1), the best outcome for everyone is for both factions to hold office (pay-offs shown in the upper left cell). The worst outcome occurs when both are out of power (shown in lower right cell). The upper right cell shows the pay-offs when the party has lost control of government, but the minority faction still fills some seats in the legislature as an opposition. The minority pay-off in opposition is lower than when the party holds power because an opposition has fewer opportunities to exercise influence or line pockets. In the lower left cell the minority faction is excluded from office, but the party still rules. If the minority faction is excluded from office but the party continues in power, the minority continues to receive some benefits, since its policy preferences are pursued and party connections are likely to bring various opportunities, but members of the excluded faction receive none of the specific perquisites of office.

Factions form in single-party regimes around policy differences and competition for leadership, as they do in other kinds of regimes, but everyone is better off if all factions remain in office. This is why single parties usually try to coopt rival factions rather than exclude them. Neither faction would be better off ruling alone, and neither would voluntarily withdraw from office unless exogenous events changed the costs and benefits of cooperating with each other (and hence changed the game itself).

Members of Personalist Cliques

During and after seizures of power, cliques based on personal loyalty form among the friends, relatives, and allies who surround all political leaders. As in single-party regimes, factions form around potential rivals to the leader. In personalist regimes, one individual dominates the military, state apparatus, and ruling party (if one exists). Because so much power is concentrated in the hands of one individual, he generally controls the coalition-building agenda. Consequently, the game between factions in personalist regimes must be depicted as a game tree instead of a two-by-two matrix in order to capture the leader’s control over the first move. As shown in Figure 2, the leader’s faction has the initiative, choosing to share the spoils and perks with the rival faction or not. The choice I have labeled “hoard” can be interpreted either as limiting the
opportunities and rents available to the rival faction or as excluding some of its members altogether.

After the leader’s faction has chosen its strategy, the rival faction must decide whether to continue supporting the regime or not. During normal times, they have strong reasons to continue. As Bratton and van de Walle note, “Because they face the prospect of losing all visible means of support in a political transition, they have little option but to cling to the regime, to sink or swim with it” (1997: 86).

In contrast to single-party regimes, the leader’s faction in a personalist regime may actually increase benefits to itself by excluding the rival faction from participation. Where the main benefits of participation in the government come from access to rents and illicit profit opportunities, benefits to individual members of the ruling group will be higher if they need not be shared too widely. Thus the leader’s faction should share only enough to keep the minimum necessary coalition winning. Keeping the predatory group relatively small may also help keep damage to the economy below the meltdown threshold, and thus increase the likelihood of regime survival. Hoarding by the leader’s faction is thus likely. If the hoarding is not too extensive, the rival faction is usually better off continuing to cooperate, and most of the time that is what they do.

If the rival faction were to withdraw its support and begin to plot the leader’s overthrow, they would risk life, liberty, and property. The rewards of a successful overthrow would be high, but so would the costs of detection, betrayal, or defeat. In Figure 2, the uncertainty over the outcome of plots is shown as a play by Nature. The plot succeeds with probability p, usually a low number, and fails with probability 1-p. The rival faction decides whether to continue its support for the leader’s faction by comparing its pay-off for support with its expected pay-off from a plot. Two considerations thus affect the choice: the benefits being derived from the status quo and the potential plotter’s assessment of the risk of plotting. As long as the personalist ruler seems powerful enough to detect plots and defeat coup attempts, the rival faction will probably continue to cooperate. The leader’s faction has an incentive to reduce the benefits to the rival faction to a level just above that needed to prevent plotting. This system is stable as long as the ruler can
distribute the minimum level of benefits needed to deter plotting and as long as the ruler himself maintains control over the security and armed forces. The situations in which these conditions become less likely are discussed below.

The Effect of Cadre Interests on the Likelihood of Breakdown

Factions exist in all governments; the interests described above determine how likely they are to undermine regime stability. Most military officers go along with continued intervention regardless of whether military rule becomes institutionalized, the leader concentrates power in his own hands, or a rival ousts the original leader, because they view their interests as similar to a Battle-of-the-Sexes game. They will return to the barracks, however, if the officer corps shows signs of disintegrating into openly competing factions.

The attitudes of ordinary officers are thus a source of fragility in military regimes. When elite rivalries or policy differences become intense and factional splits become threatening, stepping down becomes an attractive option for most. For officers, there is life after democracy, as all but the highest regime officials can usually return to the barracks with their status and careers untarnished. Prosecutions for human rights violations have been rare in the immediate aftermath of transitions from military rule.

Policy differences, leadership struggles, and succession crises also occur in single-party regimes, but except in extraordinary situations, most cadres just keep their heads down and wait to see who wins. Consequently, even intense factionalization in single-party regimes tends not to undermine stability. Only when cadres in single-party regimes see their own political survival as better served by leaving the party than by remaining loyal do they desert – as, for example, when they can foresee that the ruling party’s days are numbered. Once a transition is underway, these desertions may hasten it, but they would not occur in ordinary times.

Rival factions in personalist regimes have more to gain than those in single-party regimes from ousting the ruler, but in normal circumstances, the risks of plotting deter them. Only when exogenous events such as serious illness reduce the ruler’s ability to detect plots would we expect to see defections within the ruling clique.
These differences explain why early analyses of regime change, which drew their insights from the transitions from military rule in Latin America, traced the initiation of political reform to splits within the ruling elite. In other regions, where rule by the professional military is less common, factions and splits within the elite can always be found but usually do not lead to regime collapse. Instead, events external to the regime, such as economic crisis, foreign pressure, and popular protest, play a larger role in bringing about the fall of dictatorships (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Huntington 1991; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Casper and Taylor 1996).

Implications of the Argument

The cadre-interests argument sketched above implies that military regimes are inherently more fragile than other kinds of authoritarianism since they tend to break down in response to internal splits, no matter what the cause of the splits. If that is true, we should expect military regimes, on average, to last less long than other forms of authoritarianism. We might also expect them to respond more strongly to economic crisis.

In contrast to military officers, the leaders of personalist regimes generally hang onto power with tooth and claw. In Bratton and van de Walle’s words, “They resist political openings for as long as possible and seek to manage the process of transition only after it has been forced on them” (1997: 83). If they are forced, by foreign pressure for example, to negotiate with opponents, they renege at the first opportunity on the agreements made.6 Military governments rarely renege on the agreements they make, not because they could not, but because agreements are made when most officers want to return to the barracks.

According to the cadre-interests argument, most of the military prefers to return to the barracks in some circumstances, and, even for most of those officers who would prefer to remain in government, the cost of resuming a more ordinary military career is low. The cost of loss of office is higher for cadres in a dominant party, but not, on average, devastating. Many prominent party leaders in the democratic regimes that follow single-party rule are former cadres of the dominant party. Although the cadres of a single-party regime cannot be expected to desert when

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6 Note, for example, the way Mobutu of Zaire (now Congo), Eyadema of Togo, and various other long-ruling African leaders manipulated electoral rules and intimidated opponents after agreeing, under pressure from international donors, to initiate multi-party elections.
times are good, if it looks as though the party’s hegemony will soon end, those who think they possess the skills to make a success of democratic politics can be expected to form or join opposition parties. Even those who remain in the ruling party to the bitter end need not despair of life after democratization, however. Many previously dominant parties continue to function as effective political actors after democratization (cf. Van de Walle and Butler 1999). In fact, they have achieved executive office in the second free and fair election after democratization in a number of ex-communist and African countries.

The members of personalist cliques, however, have fewer options. Joining the opposition prior to a transition can have very high costs, and many who desert the regime must go into exile in order to remain alive and out of jail. From exile, they may plot and organize, but few who remain at home are willing to risk public opposition. Those who stick with the regime to the end are much less likely to find respected places in the post-transition political world than are the close supporters of single-party and military regimes. The death or physical incapacity of the leader changes everything, however, since it tends to undermine the effectiveness of the security apparatus and thus dramatically reduces the risks of plotting.

Like members of personalist cliques, cadres of single-party regimes have few reasons to desert in normal circumstances. Furthermore, because power is less concentrated in single-party regimes, they are less vulnerable to the death or illness of leaders. Thus we should expect single-party regimes to last longer than either military or personalist regimes. Because the dominant strategy of the ruling coalition in single-party regimes is to coopt potential opposition, single-party regimes tend to respond to crisis by granting modest increases in political participation, increasing opposition representation in the legislature, and granting some opposition demands. They attempt to give the opposition enough to deter them from risky plots and uprisings while continuing to hang onto power.

In the most common kind of regime crisis, one caused by economic trouble, the ruling elite in any kind of authoritarian regime divides into intransigents and moderates as they decide how to respond. In military regimes, that division itself tends to persuade many officers that the time has come for a return to the barracks. In personalist regimes, the ruling coalition narrows as the
intransigents circle the wagons and exclude moderates from access to increasingly scarce spoils. Former regime moderates may then join the opposition (cf. Bratton and van de Walle 1997).

Ruling parties, however, often attempt to distract citizens from their economic grievances by granting them modest political rights. This strategy only works sometimes, but it works often enough to extend the average lifetime of single-party regimes.

Data for Testing the Argument

To test the argument above, I have collected data on all authoritarian regimes (except monarchies) of three or more years duration that existed between 1946 and 2000, in countries existing prior to 1990 with a population of more than one million. Authoritarian regimes already in existence in 1946, such as those in the Soviet Union, Mexico, and Turkey, are included and their length of time in office is calculated from the time they actually took power. Countries that became independent after 1945 enter the data set at the time of independence (if authoritarian). Countries that have achieved independence since 1990 because of the break-up of communist states have not been included because the inclusion of a fairly large number of countries with severely truncated regimes might have biased conclusions.

Regimes are defined as sets of formal and informal rules and procedures for selecting national leaders and policies. Using this definition, periods of instability and temporary "moderating" military interventions (Stepan 1971) are considered interregna, not regimes. That is, they are periods of holding customary rules in temporary abeyance, struggle over rules, or transition from one set of rules to the next. The three-year threshold is simply a way of excluding such periods from the data set. This cut-off was chosen after considerable empirical investigation of very short-lived authoritarian interludes because it introduced the least misclassification into the data. The military governed during most of these interregna. If these periods were included in the data set, they would increase the strength of the findings I report below.

Regimes were classified as military, single-party, personalist, or hybrids of these categories. Military regimes were defined as those governed by an officer or retired officer, with the support of the military establishment and some routine mechanism for high level officers to influence policy choice and appointments. Single-party regimes were defined as regimes in which the party
has some influence over policy, controls most access to political power and government jobs, and has functioning local-level organizations. Regimes were considered personalist if the leader, who usually came to power as an officer in a military coup or as the leader of a single-party government, had consolidated control over policy, recruitment, and the security apparatus in his own hands, in the process marginalizing other officers' influence and/or reducing the influence and functions of the party. In the real world, many regimes have characteristics of more than one regime type. When regimes had important characteristics of more than one pure regime type, especially when the area specialist literature contained disagreements about the importance of military and party institutions, I put them in hybrid categories.  

Findings

The expectation that military regimes, because they have more endogenous sources of fragility than other types of authoritarianism, survive less long on average is borne out by evidence. If we consider the life spans of those regimes that had ended by 2000, military regimes have lasted on average 8.5 years. Personalist regimes survived 15 years on average, and single-party regimes (excluding those maintained by foreign occupation or threat of intervention) nearly 24 years.

Although these differences in the average length of different types of regime are quite large, we cannot be sure that they really reflect differences caused by regime type. Military regimes are more common in Latin America, where levels of economic development are relatively high, and personalist regimes are most common in Africa, where economies tend to be less developed. It might be that the stronger demand for democracy by citizens of more developed countries accounts for the shorter duration of military regimes. To test for this possibility, I have carried out

7 The data collection and coding are described in Geddes 2003.
8 Reminder: authoritarian interludes lasting less than three years have been excluded from the data set. The military ruled during most of these interludes. If they were included, the average length of military rule would be reduced. Nordlinger, who did not exclude them from his calculations, found that military regimes last five years on average (1977: 139).
9 Regimes maintained in power by direct foreign occupation or the threat of military intervention have been excluded from the calculation of average lifespan here because their longevity depends on events outside domestic control. The excluded regimes are those in Afganistan 1979-93, Bulgaria 1947-90, Cambodia 1979-90, Czechoslovakia 1948-90, German Democratic Republic 1945-90, Hungary 1949-90, and Poland 1947-89. The average length of these regimes is 34 years.
statistical tests of the effect of regime type on the probability of regime breakdown, controlling for level of development, growth rate, region, and other factors expected to affect regime survival.\(^{10}\)

Region is used as a quasi-fixed effects estimator. Fixed effects estimators are used to hold constant aspects of history and culture that might affect the outcome of interest but that cannot be directly measured.\(^{11}\) A dummy variable for Foreign Imposed is used to control for the effect of direct military occupation or the credible threat of foreign intervention that keeps some authoritarian regimes in power.

I use two different models in the analysis to make sure that the results do not depend on model specification. The first, reported in the first two columns of Table 1, is a hazard model. Hazard models are used in medical research and other areas to predict the survival of individuals with certain conditions, given various treatments. Thus this type of model seems appropriate also

\(^{10}\) The measure of level of development used is the natural log of GDP per capita. The measure of growth is change in GDP per capita averaged over the two years preceding the observation year. Averaging over the observation year and the one before that produces the same substantive results. Economic data are from the Penn World Tables 2000. Values for cases included in Penn World Tables 1992 but excluded from the 2000 update (mostly communist countries that no longer exist) are imputed using Amelia. For most countries, the PWT cover 1950-2000, which means that regime years prior to 1951 are excluded from the statistical analysis. In addition, no economic data from Afghanistan, Albania, Cambodia, Libya, North Korea, Vietnam, South Vietnam, and South Yemen are available. Scattered country-years are also missing for a number of other countries; a list of missing country-years is available from the author. Since the period covered is quite long and I cannot think of any reason to believe that transitions during the years covered would be different from those in the years before and after, I do not think the years excluded introduce bias into the results. The countries left out of the data set are different, however, from those included. All but Libya had or have single-party or single-party/personalist regimes. Their lifespans are unusually long (average 34.7 years) and nearly all of them are very poor. If they were included in the data analysis, they would probably further strengthen the coefficient for the effect of single-party regime but reduce the effect of the level of development on regime stability.

\(^{11}\) Usually country dummy variables are used as fixed effects estimators, but they could not be used to analyze these data because they cause countries with only one regime to be dropped from the analysis. In this data set, half the countries have had only one authoritarian regime, either because one stable regime remained in power for several decades or because the country is usually democratic and had only one postwar authoritarian interlude. More serious than the loss of cases per se, regimes in the single-regime cases are, on average, unusually long lived, and the single-regime cases are especially likely to be single-party regimes. The use of country fixed effects estimators would eliminate 60 percent of the single-party regimes from the analysis.
for explaining the survival of a different kind of entity. The second two columns of Table 1 show the results of a Logit Model used to estimate the effects of the same variables.

Hazard ratios have a simple intuitive interpretation. Ratios above one mean that the variables associated with them increase the probability of regime collapse. Those between zero and one mean that the variables reduce the chance of breakdown. Because regime types are nominal categories, they are entered into the models as dummy variables; for example, if the regime is military, it is coded “one” and otherwise it is coded “zero.” The left out regime type is personalist, the middle category in terms of longevity. Thus, the hazard ratios reported should be interpreted as referring to differences between the probability of breakdown in the type of regime associated with a particular ratio as compared with that of personalist regimes.

In the first column of Table 1, the hazard ratio for military regime is 3.62, which means that, all else equal, military regimes are more than three times as likely to break down as personalist. In column one, the hazard ratio for single-party regimes, 0.33, means that, all else equal, single-party regimes are only one-third as likely to collapse as personalist.

As can be seen in Table 1, military regimes break down more readily than other types. The hazard ratios for the military regime variable are above three and statistically significant in both hazard models, and the logit coefficients are positive and statistically significant. The two intermediate regime types, military/personalist and hybrid (in which personalist/single-party regimes predominate since there are very few military/single-party regimes) are not very different from personalist regimes, so it is unsurprising that their hazard ratios and coefficients have intermediate values and often fail to achieve statistical significance. Single-party regimes, however, are about as much more resilient than personalist regimes as military are less. Hazard ratios for the single-party variable show that they are much less likely to fail than personalist, all else equal, and logit coefficients are negative. All are statistically significant. Finally, the triple

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12 Weibull regression is the appropriate form of hazard model to use when the effect of time is not constant, as is true here.
13 Splines have to be added to the logit model to capture the effect of the time trend. They are jointly significant.
hybrid regimes that combine aspects of single-party, personalist, and military regime characteristics are the strongest of all in all models.  

The control variables used in the models also show some interesting effects. As the level of development rises, authoritarian regimes, like democratic, become more stable. This finding is consistent with that of Londregan and Poole (1990 and 1996), who find that the best predictor of coups, in both democratic and authoritarian regimes, is poverty. Like Przeworski et al.’s (2000) findings, it challenges conventional demand-centered explanations of the relationship between increased development and democracy. This finding is inconsistent with the idea that the citizens of more affluent countries are more likely to demand democratization. Rather, it suggests that when authoritarian governments manage the economy well over the long term, regime allies remain loyal and citizens supportive or at least acquiescent. That interpretation is reinforced by the effect of growth on the probability of regime breakdown. In other words, both long- and short-term economic performance aid authoritarian stability.

In light of the arguments about the effects of religion, culture and colonial heritage on the development of democratic values, it is somewhat surprising that most of the region variables show no effect. The left out region here is southern Europe (Portugal, Spain, and Greece), and we might have expected the regions most culturally distinct from Europe to exhibit differences in the likelihood of regime transition. Interestingly, the only region with large, statistically significant hazard ratios and logit coefficients close to significance is South America, the region most culturally similar to Southern Europe.

Authoritarian regimes in South America seem more likely to break down, even after controlling for regime type and economic performance. My interpretation for this finding, though it cannot be proven using these data, is that democratic values are quite widespread in South America. These values may sometimes be overwhelmed by fear of chaos or economic disaster, and at these times many support military intervention. But opinion changes when things calm down or the authoritarian government shows that it is no better at holding economic disaster at

\[14\] The triple hybrid category includes six long-lived and hard to classify regimes. It is included more to prevent these regimes from artificially inflating the effect of other regime types than to draw conclusions about these regimes per se.
bay than the democratic government preceding it. The famously fickle bourgeois allies of the South American authoritarian governments of the sixties and seventies, for example, quickly deserted them when new economic problems arose.

It might also seem surprising, given the arguments suggesting an affinity between Islam and authoritarianism, that dictatorships in the Middle East are no more likely to survive than those in other areas. This finding might well be different if monarchies had been included in the analysis, but it suggests that non-monarchical forms of authoritarianism may not be especially durable in the Middle East. The finding does not imply, however, that democratization is likely. Rather, in the Middle East one dictatorship usually follows another.

Columns two and four of Table 1 show the effects of controlling for two other factors that might be expected to affect the longevity of authoritarian regimes, the percent Muslim population and civil war. Many studies have found that Islamic countries are more likely to have authoritarian governments, so we might suspect that such governments would be more hardy in Islamic countries. We might also suspect that civil war would increase the likelihood of breakdown for any kind of regime. The most important result of introducing these variables is that the effect of regime type is not affected by their inclusion, which adds to our confidence that types of authoritarianism really do affect regime durability. Percent Islam is statistically significant in both models, but suggests that regimes in countries with larger Islamic populations are more likely to fall, not less as we might have expected.\footnote{This finding also might be reversed by including monarchies in the analysis.} Civil war has the expected effect of making breakdown more likely, though it is not quite statistically significant in either model.\footnote{Dependence on oil exports was also included in some models, but had no effect itself and did not affect substantive results. Findings not shown here because oil data were unavailable for most country-years.}

Since military regimes are more fragile, we might expect them to be more easily destabilized by economic crisis. To test for that possibility, I redo the logit analysis, this time including interaction terms for Military Regime Type with Growth and Single-Party Regime Type with Growth.\footnote{Logit results are shown here because their graphs are easy to interpret, but hazard models produced the same substantive results. An interaction between the Triple Hybrid regime type and}
rate on the probability of regime collapse in the selected regime type relative to that of the left-out regimes (Personalist and both types of Hybrids). The coefficient for Growth itself shows the effect of economic performance on the likelihood of survival for the left-out regime types as a group.

Table 2 shows that Military and Single-Party regimes are both more prone to crisis when the economy fails than are more personalist dictatorships. Neither coefficient quite reaches conventional levels of statistical significance, but both show the expected negative effect of economic decline on regime stability. The coefficient for Military regimes is only a little larger (in absolute terms) than that for Single-Party, but as Figure 3, Panel C shows, this difference in the coefficient becomes quite substantial when economic growth drops below zero. In personalist and hybrid kinds of dictatorship, in contrast, the effect of the economy on the probability of breakdown is much lower (-0.03) and not statistically significant. Although I cannot yet show that my interpretation of this is correct, I believe that this finding reflects, on the one hand, the importance of factors not included here, such as leaders’ deaths and foreign intervention, in explaining the collapse of personalist regimes. On the other hand, it also reflects the ability of personalist dictators to continue delivering benefits to their close supporters, and thus maintain regime support, even when the aggregate economy is declining.

Note that even with regime type and growth interaction terms added to the model, the dummy variable for military regime continues to show that military regimes are more likely to collapse. In other words, they have sources of fragility other than their susceptibility to crisis when the economy is doing poorly. With the exception of Growth Rate, which in this model refers only to growth in the personalist and hybrid regimes, the other coefficients in the model are largely unchanged by adding the interaction terms. Foreign Imposed continues to have the opposite sign from that expected, though it still fails to quite reach statistical significance. Civil War still seems to increase the likelihood of breakdown, as expected, but is also not quite significant.

Logit coefficients have no simple intuitive interpretation, so their effects are often easier to understand from graphs. Figure 3 shows the effect of economic performance on the likelihood of regime breakdown in military and single-party regimes, with other variables in the model set at growth is also shown in order to prevent these unusual regimes from being lumped into the
their means or modes. Panel A shows the effect of economic performance on the probability of breakdown in military regimes. The center line is the predicted probability of collapse, and the top and bottom lines show the 90 percent confidence interval around the prediction. (Nearly all cases fall between plus and minus ten percent change in per capita GDP per year.) The graph shows that military regimes are fairly unstable when growing at anything below about five percent per year and that the likelihood of breakdown rises rapidly and linearly as economic performance declines. Panel B shows the same predicted breakdown rate and 90 percent confidence interval for single-party regimes. They do not begin to become more unstable until the economy is falling at about three percent a year, so they have a considerable cushion to get them through hard times, but when real crisis sets in, the probability of collapse rises. Panel C compares the predicted probability of breakdown for military and single-party regimes, at any given rate of growth. As can be seen in this graph, military regimes are more likely than others to fall at any level of economic performance, but as the economy worsens, their disadvantage relative to single-party regimes worsens.

Personalist regimes (not shown) are in all economic circumstances less likely to fall than military regimes and in most, more likely to fall than single-party. Economic performance has a less predictable effect on them, but they have other sources of fragility relative to single-party regimes.

Conclusion

This study makes two contributions to the literature on regime transitions: it proposes a theoretical innovation that subsumes a number of the apparently contradictory arguments made in the literature; and it tests two implications drawn from this theoretical argument on a data set of nearly all post World War II authoritarian regimes. The theoretical argument begins with a simple game-theoretic portrayal of the incentives facing officers in military regimes as contrasted with those of cadres in single-party regimes and clique members in personalist regimes. If the incentives shown in the games are, on average, accurate, then we can understand why the

Personalist category.
process of transition from military regimes differs from that in single-party and personalist regimes. Because most officers value the unity and capacity of the military institution more than they value holding office, they cling less tightly to power than do office holders in other forms of authoritarianism, and, indeed, often initiate transitions.

This basic insight leads to explanations for many of the differences between early transitions, mostly from military rule, and later transitions, from personalist and single-party rule. Most transitions from military rule begin, as O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) note, with internal disagreements and splits. Most personalist and single-party regimes, however, maintain their grip on power as long as possible. Consequently, as the data analysis shows, they last longer.

Because of these differences between officers' and cadres' motivations, economic crisis -- usually seen as the most important single reason for regime breakdown -- affects different types of dictatorship differently. Good economic performance strengthens all kinds of regimes, though it is insufficient to overcome the inherent weakness of military regimes. Poor performance, however, is devastating for military regimes. They can weather very little economic bad news and, on average, collapse with higher growth rates than do other types.

Transitions from single-party rule, though the subject of numerous case studies, have played a lesser role in the comparative transitions literature because fewer have occurred (besides those caused by the Soviet collapse and thus not seen as comparable by most analysts). Rather, individual single-party regimes, especially Mexico, have tended to be treated as unique exceptions to the democratic rush of the third wave. Mexico specialists failed to notice that single-party regimes in other parts of the world also survived for many decades despite economic crises, and Asianists failed to notice that single-party regimes outside the areas of Chinese settlement have resisted democratization as long as those in which Confucian values prevail. The data analysis here puts the experiences of Mexico, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, and several Islamic countries in a useful comparative perspective. It shows that single-party regimes are, on average, simply remarkably long-lived and resilient. They survive longer in richer countries than in poorer, but even in Africa their longevity has been notable.
When facing intense pressure from donors or uncontrollable popular opposition, however, single-party regimes usually negotiate their extrications. Like officers, the cadres of single-party regimes can expect life as they know it to continue after liberalization or even democratization. If they cannot avoid regime change, they are better off in a democracy than in some other form of authoritarianism. Previously hegemonic parties have remained important in political life in most countries that have fully democratized, but they have been outlawed and repressed in several that did not. Consequently, leaders of dominant parties have good reason to negotiate an extrication rather than risking a more violent ouster.

At the beginning of this paper I argued that the dearth of theories of authoritarian politics had impeded the understanding of transitions. This study has taken a small step in the direction of building such theories. The data collected for this study have made possible a few generalizations about the likelihood of authoritarian breakdown that had remained hidden from analysts whose studies focused on only a few cases or a single region. Much more remains to be done both of theory building and data analysis.

\[\text{[18]The data collection, however, would not have been possible without these prior studies. The kind of subtle and detailed evidence needed to test the hypotheses implied by the argument above could not have been found in the work of non-area specialists, and the hypotheses could never have been tested using off-the-shelf data sets.}\]
References


Geddes, Barbara. 1999. "What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?" *Annual Review of Political Science* II, 115-44.


Figure 1
Games between Factions in Military and Single-Party Regimes

Panel A: Game between Military Factions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minority Faction</th>
<th>Majority Faction</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>intervene</td>
<td>a, b</td>
<td>c, d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>barracks</td>
<td>d, c</td>
<td>b, a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel B: Game between Factions in Single-Party Regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rival Faction</th>
<th>Majority (Leader’s Faction)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in office</td>
<td>a, a</td>
<td>b, c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>out of office</td>
<td>c, b</td>
<td>d, d</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Where a > b > c > d, for both factions in both games
Figure 3: The Effect of Economic Performance on Stability in Different Kinds of Dictatorship

Panel A

Economic Growth in Military Regimes

Middle line is the predicted probability of breakdown, given rates of growth. Top and bottom lines show the upper and lower bounds of a 90% confidence interval.

Panel B: Effect of Economic Performance in Single-Party Regimes

Middle line is the predicted probability of breakdown, given levels of growth. Top and bottom lines mark the upper and lower bounds of a 90% confidence interval.
Top line is predicted probability of breakdown at given growth rate for military regimes. Middle line is predicted probability of breakdown for single-party regimes. Bottom line, triple hybrids.

For all graphs, control variables are set as follows: region is set at Central America (the “average” region); civil war, no; foreign imposed, no; all other variables are set at their means.
Table 1: Effect of Regime Type on Likelihood of Breakdown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Type</th>
<th>Weibull Regression, Hazard Ratios</th>
<th>Multiple Imputation Logit, Coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>3.62** 3.79**</td>
<td>1.20** 1.31**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military-Personalist</td>
<td>2.16** 1.64</td>
<td>0.57* 0.33</td>
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<tr>
<td>Single-Party Hybrid</td>
<td>1.05 1.22</td>
<td>0.11 0.28</td>
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<tr>
<td>Single-Party</td>
<td>0.33** 0.32**</td>
<td>-1.19** -1.18**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triple Hybrid</td>
<td>0.17** 0.15**</td>
<td>-1.82** -1.91**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level Development</td>
<td>0.67** 0.65**</td>
<td>-0.49** -0.54**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth Rate</td>
<td>0.94** 0.94**</td>
<td>-0.07** -0.07**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Imposed</td>
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<td>0.81 1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>1.77 1.34</td>
<td>0.16 -0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Am., Caribbean</td>
<td>1.41 1.34</td>
<td>0.15 0.09</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
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<td>-0.28 -0.45</td>
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<td>Middle East</td>
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<td>0.43 -0.61</td>
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<td>North Africa</td>
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<td>-0.33 -1.59**</td>
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<td>South America</td>
<td>4.02** 4.74**</td>
<td>1.10* 1.28**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
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<td>-0.17 -0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Islam</td>
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<td>0.01**</td>
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<td>Civil War</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spline 1</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spline 2</td>
<td>0.06**</td>
<td>0.03**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spline 3</td>
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<td>0.07*</td>
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<td>Spline 4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>0.79</td>
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<td>Number of Observations</td>
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<td>2118</td>
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<tr>
<td>p</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>1.97</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent Accurately Predicted</td>
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<td>94.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Statistically significant at .05 or better.  * Statistically significant at .1 to .05.

1 TSCS Logit, standard errors adjusted for clustering on coreg.
1 The left out regime category is Personalist.
1 Natural log of GDP per capita from Penn World Tables 2000, with missing values imputed using Amelia. Standard errors for this variable underestimated in Weibull models.
1 From Penn World Tables 2000, with missing values imputed, growth averaged over time T-1 and T-2. Standard errors for growth underestimated in the Weibull models.
1 Southern Europe is the left out region.
Table 2: Effect of Economic Performance on the Likelihood of Breakdown in Different Types of Authoritarian Regime

| Regime Type: \( ^{\text{vi}} \) | Logit Coefficients | \( P>|z|^{\text{vi}} \) |
|-------------------------------|--------------------|-----------------|
| Military                      | 1.39               | .000            |
| Military-Personalist          | 0.34               | .305            |
| Single-Party Hybrid           | 0.28               | .371            |
| Single-Party                  | -1.25              | .001            |
| Triple Hybrid                 | -2.02              | .000            |
| Level Development \( ^{\text{vii}} \) | -0.55              | .001            |
| Growth Rate \( ^{\text{x}} \) | -0.03              | .342            |
| Foreign Imposed               | 1.16               | .130            |

| Region: \( ^{\text{x}} \) | Logit Coefficients | \( P>|z|^{\text{x}} \) |
|---------------------------|--------------------|-----------------|
| Asia                      | 0.06               | .926            |
| Central Am., Caribbean    | 0.22               | .699            |
| Eastern Europe            | -0.38              | .565            |
| Middle East               | -0.34              | .687            |
| North Africa              | -1.36              | .081            |
| South America             | 1.49               | .026            |
| Sub-Saharan Africa        | -0.35              | .571            |
| Percent Islam             | 0.01               | .001            |
| Civil War                 | 0.47               | .093            |
| Military-Growth Interaction| -0.10              | .107            |
| Single-Party-Growth Interaction| -0.09          | .128            |
| Triple Hybrid-Growth Interaction| -0.02         | .820            |
| Spline 1                  | 0.02               | .380            |
| Spline 2                  | 0.07               | .006            |
| Spline 3                  | 0.08               | .282            |
| Spline 4                  | -0.02              | .870            |
| Constant                  | 0.64               | .661            |

Number of Observations 2118

\(^1\) Standard errors adjusted for clustering on coreg.
\(^2\) The left out regime category is Personalist.
\(^3\) Natural log of GDP per capita from Penn World Tables 2000, with missing values imputed using Amelia.
\(^4\) From Penn World Tables 2000, with missing values imputed, growth averaged over time T-1 and T-2.
\(^5\) Southern Europe is the left out region.
Southern Europe is the left out region.

Standard errors adjusted for clustering on coreg.

The left out regime category is Personalist.

Natural log of GDP per capita from Penn World Tables 2000, with missing values imputed using Amelia.

From Penn World Tables 2000, with missing values imputed, growth averaged over time T-1 and T-2.

Southern Europe is the left out region.