



Dear Delegates,

It is my pleasure to welcome you to the Reformed Security Council simulation at the 2007 UCLA Collegiate Model UN Conference! My name is Swati Srivastava and I am thrilled to be your director for this excitingly relevant committee. I will begin by telling you a little about myself.

I have been involved in Model UN for over 6 years, the highlight of which has been meeting Kofi Annan at The Hague International Model UN when I was on the secretariat. At UCLA I am pursuing a double degree in Political Science and Global Studies with an emphasis on International Relations and Public Policy. Along with Model UN, I am an active member of the UCLA Parliamentary Debate team and enjoy reading anything from Aristotle to David Foster Wallace.

The United Nations and I have a very close bond due to my participation in the UNICEF Youth Action Group and being an intern for the UN Peacekeeping Mission in Haiti. Needless to say, I absolutely adore MUN and am a firm believer in its ability to connect us to world issues that would have otherwise been neglected in the education forum.

Security Council reforms have been the talk of the UN town for quite a while now, and we here at UCLA deemed it important to reflect those opinions by only conducting a Security Council in its reformed avatar at our conference this year. Challenging, fast-paced, crisis-filled, and yet providing ample time for substantial debate, this committee guarantees an advanced MUNer the experience of a lifetime.

As always, Security Council will be dealing with an open agenda, however I have provided two potential topics: Preventive Diplomacy in Conflict and Peace-keeping Reform. It is apt that the new council will look to improve its overall goal of peace and security by addressing growing concerns of conflict escalation as well as peace-building.

The reforms to the council include the addition of six permanent representatives from India, Japan, Brazil, Germany, Algeria and South Africa along with twelve non-permanent members of Venezuela, Afghanistan, Chad, Haiti, Egypt, Czech Republic, Iraq, Lebanon, The Netherlands, Pakistan, Spain and Argentina. Taking into account the big five, the new council has 23 members.

In closing, join me in the beautiful city of Los Angeles and come prepared to be surprised, enthralled and rewarded. If you have any questions regarding the committee do not hesitate to email me at ssrivast@ucla.edu. I wish you luck with your research and I'll see you in January!

Sincerely,
Swati Srivastava
Director, Reformed Security Council



Topic One: Preventive Diplomacy in Conflict

Preventive Diplomacy

The origins of the term ‘preventive diplomacy’ can be traced to UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, who, in his annual report to the General Assembly in 1960, said that UN efforts “keep localized international disputes from provoking larger confrontations between the superpowers.”ⁱ More recently, it has been applied to an unmanageably broad range of activities, objectives and policies, including people-to-people conflict resolution dialogues, crisis prevention mediation, war de-escalation and termination, democracy building, economic development and the eradication of poverty, even environmental preservation.

However, one of the problems with the definition of preventive diplomacy is that it blurs the distinction between preventing war or other mass violence from happening, and containing war and mass violence that have already begun. When Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali puts preventive diplomacy as “action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur,” the final clause shows such a conflict of definition.ⁱⁱ It is not that war and peace necessarily are dichotomous states of affairs, but it is useful to distinguish diplomacy intended to prevent the occurrence of a war from diplomacy seeking to limit the intensification of a war.

If preventive diplomacy was adequately used, the disasters of Rwanda, Congo, Somalia, Former Yugoslavia, Georgia, Angola, Haiti, Cambodia and Sudan would have been saved. If preventive diplomacy was adequately used, and the world’s VCR went in rewind, 50 million people would not have died as a consequence of the disasters. If



preventive diplomacy was adequately used, there would be no use for a \$7.1 billion budget for conflict aftermath.ⁱⁱⁱ What can contribute to making sure the “never again” to actually manifest itself? In order for preventive diplomacy to be effective in avoiding conflict leading up to genocide, it is imperative that the Security Council ensure political will in committing help to crises by being aggressive against potential perpetrators, make use of special envoys in areas of high tension, and utilize the resources of the United Nations and its available prevention resources.

Political Will

A lack of political will is often credited as the reason behind failures in intervention during humanitarian crises. What this means is that countries too embroiled in their own matters fail to react promptly when the news of a conflict arises. This “not my people, not my problem” mentality must be rejected in favor of an approach that understands that all countries, and not just those party to the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, have a common obligation to stop a humanitarian crisis from escalating. The value of human life is the lowest common denominator shared by all cultures, and this value must be respected and fought for. An instance of political will that halted group violence is seen in the persecution of the Baha’i community in Iran. After the fundamentalist revolution in Iran, the historical persecution of Baha’i flared up. More than 200 Baha’i were executed in a relatively short time. It is reasonable to expect that without bystander influence, the intensity of the violence would have increased.^{iv} However, actions by the Baha’i communities outside Iran, and representations by them to governments and to international agencies, led to a number of resolutions by the United



Nations and individual countries condemning the persecution of the Baha'i in Iran. The Baha'i community essentially generated political will for governments to act and speak out against the crimes that were being committed.

Special Envoys

Halting violence often involves the use of special envoys as they can communicate the disapproval of the international community and consequences that will follow if violence continues. United States' President Carter would suit such an occupation perfectly, due to his prior credibility as a peacekeeper, especially in North Korea, as well as his apt for understanding political turmoil. Other important figures can be past UN Secretary Generals, ambassadors and even celebrities. Envoys can carry out preventive diplomacy by offering help of various kinds: with mediation, conflict resolution, engagement with leaders in supportive and healing ways, and helping leaders to find ways to respond to the needs of their people without generating violence.^v The direct contact of such envoys can be crucial with leaders of potentially genocidal groups who have issues with identity, security, and connection to others. The Security Council must recognize that these international figures can help affirm the identity of a group and enhance the feeling of security and a connection to the world, by being involved in conflict prevention. This form of conflict containment would see preventive diplomacy at its best.

Resources

Many scholars have asked for the need for early warning and early action systems along with a well-trained response force, restriction on small arms trade, mobilization of



NGOs, and outlawing genocide in domestic law.^{vi} All of these actions are either already being done by the United Nations, or are in the reform processes. So, for preventive diplomacy to act upon certified information, have force as a back-up measure as well as deterrence, reduce likelihood of group violence by limiting tools of murder, allowing for a grassroots approach to have eyes and ears on the field, and to ensure that perpetrators understand the gravity of their crime, the above actions are valid propositions for the international community. Many times means are already available but either there is not enough funding or there is a lack of awareness about the availability of such resources in the diplomatic community. In any case, preventive diplomacy works not just from within the United Nations but also beside it, as non-profit organizations or ordinary individuals take action to halt tensions and violence. For such groups, the Security Council should make available their means, after a screening process, so such diplomacies can bear fruitful results.

Conclusion

The body must react to conflicts building up on the world stage by becoming not just a mediator but also an avoider of catastrophe. It is this role that the new Security Council must embrace more so than any other as it is in the success of preventive diplomacy that the true potency of the United Nations lies. With added permanent and non-permanent representation from various regions, the council will be subjected to more solutions and proposals than ever before on the various facets of conflict deterrence. It is so advisable that the body look at strategies for conflict prevention as the first item of agenda to give brainstorm ideas and resources that may become useful at a later stage.



Finally, preventive diplomacy requires the effective use of withholding force and showing consideration; for such intent, it is important for member states to use the carrots before the sticks.



Topic Two: Peace-keeping Reform

A History of Peace-Keeping

During the Cold War years, in response to threats and breaches of the peace, the United Nations members established and developed the concept of “peacekeeping.” Observation missions (the ‘blue berets’) or Peace-keeping Forces (PKFs), commonly known as ‘blue helmets’, furthered the cause of preventive diplomacy. The PKFs are described as “those United Nations operations in which civil or military personnel take part, with the consent of the parties involved and under the orders of the United Nations, to help control and resolve international conflicts or internal conflicts, real or potential, which have a clear international dimension.”^{vii} The basic characteristics of these operations are:^{viii}

- They take place with the agreement of hostile parties
- Each operation has the approval and support of the United Nations (it needs the affirmative vote of at least 9 out of 15 with no vetoes in the Security Council)
- The military personnel are volunteers and belong to the governments taking part
- This military personnel is under the orders of the Secretary- General, who reports to the Security Council
- Peace-keeping operations are impartial
- Force is not normally used, unless chapter VII of the UN Charter is applied to a particular mission
- The operation must be paid for by the Member States

The process of a peace-keeping operation generally follows this path: the possibility of sending observers or establishing a peace-keeping operation is studied; then, an advance planning team is sent to the area; following that, a peace-keeping operation or observation mission is established; after this, blue helmets or observers are deployed as per the Security Council mandate; this leads to, depending on the escalation of conflict, a fact finding mission, threat of sanctions, embargo and finally military intervention; at any



of those points- and most UN missions do not advance beyond sanctions- the operation or mission comes to an end.^{ix} Mandates of recent peace-keeping operations have involved supervision of cease-fire agreements such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo, overseeing electoral processes in Haiti, humanitarian assistance in Former Yugoslavia, protection of refugees and displaced people in Uganda, and promotion of political reconciliation in Rwanda. This shows that the members of the Security Council are willing to expand their traditional roles of mediation and observation, and are taking a more aggressive stance on prevention. In light of these developments, the peace-keeping reforms should be complimentary to the pulse of the diplomats.

United Nations reform is essential to the prevention of genocide, as the improvements will ensure a more efficient and productive international organization that will be able to meet the demands of a conflict on the field as well as garner political will from member nations for more comprehensive resolutions at home base. The UN charter was formed 60 years ago in response to WWII and much of the provisions are outdated and do not apply to the current globalized world. Thus to deal with problems such as non-state actors as perpetrators and the use of force, it is imperative that the implementation of the UN charter undergoes some renovation.

For successful conflict prevention, it is necessary that peacekeepers are equipped with clear and appropriate mandates, apportioned required funds from sources other than member nations while strengthening current means of state donations, be provided with accurate and timely intelligence, given lengthier contracts for UN international personnel, and have limited number of different foreign troops participating in missions.



Mandates

In the case of Rwanda, one of the most criticized failures of the UN was the limitation of the UNAMIR^x mandate in protecting civilians, which resulted in an inability to halt the group violence against the Tutsis.^{xi} Security Council refused to provide more troops to the mission, and instead under pressure from the defeated United States after a Somalia intervention, decided to withdraw a majority of foreign forces. The inconsistency in the action on ground and the reaction in the Security Council provided for a weak and ill- suited mandate that aggravated the situation by not providing an adequate resistance to the Hutu violence, thereby promoting the evil by omission of eliminating the perpetrators. Thus, mandates need to reflect more accurately the needs of the peacekeepers on ground, especially in a fast paced conflict torn zone.

Funding

In a recent report, Kofi Annan stated that over \$5.1 billion is allocated to peacekeeping.^{xii} Should this not be enough to fund peace? Since member states are responsible for providing money for peacekeeping missions, countries are weary of entering into too many battles to avoid the costs. This leads to a selection of issues that are worth spending the money on for the member states, in which areas of low importance are disregarded or placed outside the obligation of the Security Council. When peacekeeping missions are dependant entirely for the approval of their budgets on internal politics and self-interests of member states, they suffer due to insufficient funds or are forced to cater to the demands of conditional aid. This compromise for sustaining peace must be abolished in favor of a more egalitarian system where private donors and



non-profit organizations are able to donate to specific missions. Many multinational corporations have interests in areas of the world with high tensions, due to trade partnerships or foreign direct investment in a nation's economy. These corporations would want a return on their investment but for that would need to insure that the infrastructure of the country is retained so consumers can spend more on the economy. To prevent the risk of lobbyists getting on the agenda through private donations, a Peace Keeping Reserve Fund should be created where such private investments can be channeled to, and from which peacekeepers can allocate the initial start-up costs until member states front their share of the financial burden. The peacekeepers will be able to receive adequate funding based on regional investments from private donors, which will in turn contribute to more efficient peacekeeping, as personnel efforts will be spent in combating the action on ground rather than filling out paperwork for budget approval.

Intelligence

A United Nations intelligence system that can anticipate conflicts and filter intelligence to units in the field is essential to peacekeeping operations working out as they are intended to. More specifically, the re-creation of a Office for Research and the Collection of Information (ORCI), which was briefly started by Secretary General Perez de Cuellar to help monitor foreign crises, should be introduced on the General Assembly agenda.^{xiii} The United Nations currently lacks the capability to be in constant and direct communication with all its units on the field. Such an information center will provide the Secretary General and the Security Council with up to date information on conditions in the field and to channel information to field units. With more precise information from



the missions, decision-makers in New York will be able to better decipher the realities on ground, reflecting it in more accurate and relevant resolutions. It is ironic that because the UN uses open voice communication networks, the parties to the conflict know more about UN force dispositions than the UN knows about the parties' locations in the conflict. Such more direct and consistent reports from the ORCI will result in a better informed and thus better armed peacekeeping force to combat the ever-revolving nature of crisis situations.

Personnel

Nobody in peacekeeping has a permanent job at the United Nations, including the Secretary-General, whose contract is renewed every year even though he is appointed for a five-year term. Civil administrators are given short term contracts ranging from three months to a year and those in hot-spots are rotated to alleviate the stress that comes with dealing with crisis missions. While this consideration is welcomed by the UN personnel, it also takes away from the performance of the job. Senior UN Administration Officers in Congo and Haiti claim “due to the limited time contracts, long term commitments become difficult. This has a spin off effect on performance as job insecurity affects the work ethic and can lead to apathy in a crisis prone mission, if there is uncertainty of a future in the region.”^{xiv} Coupled with the stress of handling real life crisis and the constant danger for life, such temporary contracts make a deadly mix for the peacekeepers. Also, the constant change of staff, while it may provide diversity, also leads to inconsistency, and the inclusion of personnel unaware of the situation at hand due to a lack of prior involvement further perpetuates the inefficiency. It remains of



importance then to have yearly contracts at the shortest, with mid-year reviews to monitor progress so there is enough incentive for peacekeepers to continue the often life-threatening occupations. Also, recently Secretary General Kofi Annan proposed some personnel and leadership reform within the UN, and amongst them acknowledged the cumbersome aspect of approving the contracts of over 17,000 UN personnel every few months.^{xv} Thus, he proposes to “replace permanent contracts with open-ended ‘continuing appointments’” which would lead to a more streamlined and effective system of handling personnel as well as give more job security to professionals.^{xvi} The cut down on bureaucracy will add to the efficient and productive environment conducive to peace building.

Foreign Troops

The general practice for peacekeeping operations with regards to number of countries participating in each mission appears to be “the more the merrier.” What this leads to is for instance, as per the February 2006 report, MONUC^{xvii} with 16,803 troops and police officers from 58 countries, and MINUSTAH^{xviii} with 9,233 total peacekeepers from 44 countries. While Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan form the major contributors in Congo, Haiti’s primary force comes from Brazil, Jordan, Chile and Uruguay. Even if the minority nations are disregarded, there is a discrepancy when major command and control is shared by members of different cultures with their own languages, standards, and perceptions of morality. What may be valid for one countryman may not apply to another. Both MONUC and MINUSTAH are Chapter VII missions, meaning that they have a more robust mandate for using force. However,



something as elementary as self-defense has variations in different countries, which would lead to inconsistencies with implementing a typical UN mandate, as it calls for force under self-protection. Furthermore, cultural problems, such as the Pakistani soldiers not drinking water during the days of Ramadan, and the Uruguayan soldiers only speaking Spanish, cause severe hindrances on the field, limiting the efficiency of the mission.^{xix} Also, differences in military capabilities pose profound problems as there are no set of standard operation procedures for the troops because UN forces do not deploy as combat units, but rather as administrative units. Thus to avoid different units operating according to their national standards, a Code of Conduct and Standard Operating Procedures must be developed for field workers as well as the number of countries participating in each peacekeeping mission must be limited. This may appear counter-productive as there is a shortage of troops, but quality should not be sacrificed for quantity. Instead, a more cohesive and standardized peacekeeping force obtained through these reforms, would be able to handle the load of the more ineffective status quo. But to insure that the mandate is adequately filled in terms of troop size, instead of nations spreading out their forces, as is the case now, they should concentrate them on fewer missions to provide more unity in thought and action. This would result in more productive peace-keeping, which would then lead to more substantial conflict prevention on the field.

Conclusion

Peacekeeping remains a trademark of the United Nations, and its operations are almost always complex missions charged with restoring institutions, organizing elections,



training the police, etc., after a civil war, in implementation of a peace agreement already reached between the parties. Since giving Chapter VII provisions to increasingly more mandates, an even more striking innovation occurred in 1999, when the UN was asked not just to keep or consolidate the peace but actually to take over the Government of two territories: East Timor- which a UN-mandated transitional administration shepherded through to independence in 2002 - and Kosovo, where the UN is still in charge of the non-military aspects of government, but talks on the territory's final status are now about to start. In itself, the missions are dangerous to UN personnel and their civilians due to local resistance and armed attacks carried out by the conflicting parties. Caught in such cross-fires, coupled with the agony of being separated with their families on crisis posts, peacekeepers deserve our gratitude in the shape of reforms that would make their jobs easier and more efficient. As Security Council obligated with preventing unnecessary deaths and destruction, this is the least it can do.

ENDNOTES

ⁱ Michael Scheter, "Possibilities for preventative diplomacy" in *Adapting the United Nations to a Postmodern Era* (New York, NY: Palgrave, 1999), 53.

ⁱⁱ United Nations, Report of the Secretary General, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*. (New York, NY: United Nations, 1992), 13.

ⁱⁱⁱ United Nations, Report of the Secretary General, *Investing in the United Nations: for a stronger organization worldwide*" (New York, NY: United Nations, 2006), 3.

^{iv} Ervin Staub, "Genocide and Mass Killing: Origins, Prevention, Healing and Reconciliation" *Political Psychology* 21(2000), 367-382.

^v Ibid.

^{vi} Roger W Smith, "Scarcity and Genocide" in *The Coming Age of Scarcity: Preventing Mass Death and Genocide in the 21st century* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1998), 219.

^{vii} Vicenc Fisas, *Blue Geopolitics: The United Nations reform and the Future of the Blue Helmets* (New Haven, CT: Pluto Press, 1995), 75.

^{viii} Ibid.

^{ix} Ibid, 77.

^x United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda

^{xi} William Rubenstein, *Genocide: A History* (Harlow, England: Pearson Longman, 2004), 287.

^{xii} United Nations, Report of the Secretary General, *Investing in the United Nations: for a stronger organization worldwide*" (New York, NY: United Nations, 2006), 1.



^{xiii} Joseph Baratta, *International Peacekeeping: History and Strengthening* (Washington: The Center for UN Reform Education, 1991), 96.

^{xiv} In private conversation. Due to confidentiality and UN procedure, names are being withheld.

^{xv} United Nations, Report of the Secretary General, “*Investing in the United Nations: for a stringer organization worldwide*” (New York, NY: United Nations, 2006), 16.

^{xvi} *Ibid.*

^{xvii} The United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

^{xviii} The United Nations Mission in Haiti.

^{xix} Fisas, 105.