by Robert Jervis. Reading for week of October 24, 2006.
Note from author, Robert Jervis: This is the introductory chapter to a book of essays of mine on intelligence. The main one, discussed at length here, is a declassified (but unfortunately redacted) version of the post-mortem I wrote for CIA in 1978-79 on why it was slow to see that the Shah of Iran might fall. The volume will also include my "Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures: The Case of Iraq," Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 29, Feb. 2006, pp.3-52, and "The Politics and Psychology of Intelligence and Intelligence Reform," The Forum, vol. 4, Issue 1, 2006 (available only electronically from The Berkeley Electronic Press).
Published: Tuesday, October 17, 2006
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