Panel 1. THE ARAB WORLD POST-UPRISINGS
What has Changed? What Hasn't?
Joel Beinin
If we analyze the post-2011 Arab world using the categories of ''the development of civil society," "political liberalization, " "transition to democracy," "economic liberalization," "good governance practices,"and "state capacities," a great deal appears to have changed– overwhelmingly for the worse. The popular uprisings of 2011 not only failed to democratize the region (with the partial exception of Tunisia), they precipitated the collapse of the Libyan and Yemeni state structures, drove Syria and Iraq into paroxysms of sectarian violence, generated or exacerbated jihadi terrorism in several countries, and empowered a praetorian dictatorship in Egypt far more repressive than the Mubarak regime. But focusing on these shifts does not take into account the continuity of the most important social, cultural, political and economic structures of the region across the divide of 2011. The principal features of the political economy (petro-based crony capitalism), governance (authoritarian patrimonialism or neo patrimonialism), society (low human development indices and a repressive public culture), and the main forms of political opposition (lslamist movements), remain the same. What changed is that in 2011 the subalterns of the Arab region burst into the historical and political arena in hitherto unprecedented ways. That upsurge of democratic popular energy has been blocked and diverted, in some cases to more militarized Islamism – which some mistakenly identify as the most noteworthy post-2011 change. The current modes of political economy and governance are no more likely to lead to self-sustaining economic development or democratization than was the case before 2011. This leaves the Arab region at an unsustainable impasse. Consequently, the significance of the challenges to the prevailing social hierarchies, cultural constraints, political structures, and mode of regulation specific to Arab petro-capitalism manifested during and since the 2011 popular uprisings may not be fully apparent for some time – perhaps decades.
Proxy Wars and State Failure after the Arab Uprisings
Marc Lynch
Since 2011, at least four Arab states – Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen – have experienced catastrophic state failure and civil wars, while several more – notably Bahrain and Egypt– have been the site of extreme violence. This paper will discuss the role of regional powers in accelerating and exacerbating those civil wars and state failures. In each case, the local dynamics which initially produced contentious political struggles became caught up in various forms of competitive external intervention. Those external interventions have had profoundly negative, often unintended, consequences. The paper will seek to explain why the states of the region embarked on such interventions, and why their interventions so consistently failed to deliver the desired results.
Crony Capitalism in the Middle East: What do we Know and why Does it Matter?
Ishac Diwan
Dissatisfaction with cronyism was a major impetus for the Arab Spring. Six years later, very little has changed in the Middle East: Cronyism remains rampant, and economic growth is below potential. This paper summarizes the main results of a project undertaken by the Economic Research Forum (ERF), which examined anew the political economy of state/business relations in the Middle East. It covers the main results of this project, which has empirically mapped the nature of political connections within the private sector in several Middle Eastern states; probed the impact of the preferential treatment of connected firms on their productivity, employment generation, and growth; and documented mechanisms of privilege, such as reliance on subsidies and credit, trade protection, and state procurement, to name a few. The paper concludes with a discussion of possible ways forward for Arab capitalism.
Panel 2. THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL ISLAM
lslamism inside, outside, or against the State?
Nathan Brown
In many Arab countries, an identifiable Islamist project took shape by the end of the twentieth century that focused on operating within existing states. While other approaches showed suspicion of, or aversion to, existing states, dominant and mainstream approaches in countries as diverse as Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, and Kuwait (and to a lesser extent Palestine and Algeria) focused, albeit with some ambivalence, on a political project aimed at steering states and public policy in ways deemed consistent with Islamic teachings. That project has mostly failed in each of those countries in different ways. Where it has succeeded, it has led to unexpected, sometimes disappointing results. This paper will not explore the reasons for those failures, but it will consider the implications. Mainstream movements grouped under the rubric of "political Islam" organized and spoke for constituencies many of whom have been left voiceless. What route will their political activism take in light of these failures?
Sectarianization and Identity Formation in the New Middle East: Sunni-Shiʻi Relations after the Arab Uprisings
Toby Matthiesen
This paper traces how the Arab uprisings, and the consequences thereof, affected Sunni-Shiʻi relations in the Middle East. How was it that mass movements that explicitly called for alliances across identity divides eventually splintered along identitarian lines? A large part of the explanation lies in the ways in which identity entrepreneurs and institutions – in many cases the old regimes and their allies – used identity boundaries to divide potentially threatening mass movements calling for radical political change. But why did sectarianism become one of the main dividing lines? The answer has chiefly to do with the religious makeup of the societies that were most strongly affected by sectarianism (Syria, Bahrain, Yemen, as well as Iraq, Lebanon, and Kuwait) and the rivalry of large states that were relatively unaffected by the Arab uprisings (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Israel, as well as external powers). Because of the centrality of the Saudi-Iran rivalry, and each side's use of sectarian identity as a foreign policy tool, the international dimension intruded on the national and instrumentalized the Sunni- Shiʻi fault line. The Qatar crisis, and the general intra-Sunni sectarianism Wahhabi/Salafi vs. Ikhwan) and the emerging anti-Islamist alliance between Salman's Arabia and the UAE, point to the limits of Sunni- Shiʻi divisions as key explanatory fault line, while still confirming the broader hypothesis that powerful state actors use identity to further their interests.
Panel 3. ART AND CULTURE IN THE NEW MIDDLE EAST
Algorithmic Resistance
Laila Sakr
This paper addresses how a computational logic of resistance influenced and shaped twenty-first century global social movements. It traces the growth of a network of open source developers in the Middle East and the United States through analysis of archived internet relay chats, social media, and technology forums, and highlights the interdependence between the twenty-first century crisis of social reproduction and internet protocols (Galloway, 2004), along with their exploitation (Galloway and Thatcher, 2007). The paper argues that the territories we traverse online are liminal spaces where algorithms act as borders.
Counter-Revolutionary Aesthetics in Egypt
Jessica Winegar
This paper examines how aesthetic forms, judgments, and practices played a central role in both delegitimizing revolutionary movements and in reproducing the longstanding power of the regime in Egypt, particularly during the period just after the 2011 uprising. It focuses on how seemingly opposed factions deployed the same aesthetic regimes to create their political stances and expand their constituencies. In sum, the presentation argues that we need to attend to the power of the aesthetic in order more fully to understand how certain political possibilities are opened or foreclosed.
Poetry Repertoires in Peak and Trough
Elliott Colla
Poetry has long had a central place in the repertoires of modem Egyptian protest movements. But what, exactly, is the role of poets within movements, and what is poetry expected to do? The answers to this question are complicated when we consider the changes that occur during the life of a protest cycle: The work of poets at moments of peak activity is quite different from their work during moments of defeat and retreat. The case of "movement poets" during the 1970’s is instructive in this regard, since it reveals not just shifts in poetic style, form and theme, but also political strategy and mood. By tracing the divergent careers of poet activists from this period such as Samir 'Abd al-Baqi, 'Izzat 'Amir, Zayn al-'Abdin Fu'ad, Sayyid Hegab, Yusri Khamis, Ahmad Fu'ad Negm, Muhammad Sayf, and Mahmud al-Shadhili , this paper explores the role of poetry within the 1968-1977 cycle of student and worker protest, and its long afterlife as a model and living tradition of culture for Egyptian activists in the present.
Panel 4. SYRIA AND IRAQ
The Arab Uprisings and the Syrian Case: Unfinished Business
Bassam Haddad
For casual observers, the Arab uprisings took a sharp tum to mayhem. For cynical observers, democratic uprisings in the Arab world were always anomalous – a view that was confirmed by their consequences. For idealists, the uprisings were the true expression of the quest for freedom and dignity that would inevitably prevail, even in the short term. The reality is that the uprisings are more complex, less conclusive, and, finally, not over. A good starting point is to think less of the Arab uprisings (or the "Arab Spring") as a single unit of analysis and, instead, consider the six individual cases separately. Despite some commonality, each case reflects a different history, social and state structures, and external relations. The trajectory of each case reflects the interaction and synergy among these factors in a rapidly changing region and a shifting global context.
At least two broad factors impinged on outcomes: First, geopolitics, whose influence both thwarted expectations and either reproduced pre-uprising structures or exposed deeply entrenched conflicts that had been hidden – perhaps with the relative exception of Tunisia. Second, the uprisings ironically provided an entry point for new totalitarian movements and sentiments that forced powerful regional and international actors to recalibrate both their preferences and patterns of coalition formation. By emphasizing the resilience of authoritarian bargains and structures, external intervention, and counter-revolution, this paper uses the case of Syria to illustrate the shattered hopes of this first phase of uprisings.
Authoritarian Apprehensions
Lisa Wedeen
This paper considers the workings of ideology in times of tumult by analyzing the hardening of sectarian identifications in the context of neoliberal autocracy's unraveling and retrenchment in Syria. Its objectives are four-fold: 1) to interrogate temporality in conditions of affective excess, in which the present is displaced by anticipatory fears – a hypothetical reaching for worst-case scenarios in advance of catastrophe – even while people settle prophylactically for the horror they know rather than the horror of uncertainty; 2) to examine the violence at the heart of ingroup solidarity; 3) to underscore how a politics of what Octave Mannoni calls disavowal – je sais bien mais quand meme (I know very well and yet nevertheless...) – can be crucial to the maintenance of status quo conventionality, perhaps particularly in moments when order is profoundly threatened; and 4) to raise questions about the nature and salience of credibility and its relationship to ideological uptake. Part one of the paper unpacks these points. Part two considers the cultivation of communal loyalties in excess of material incentives in an effort to understand how distinct political imaginaries and forms of addressability proved crucial to regime survival. Part three discusses what Raymond Williams called residual and/or preemergent forms of sociality, using his insights to theorize how sectarian attachments work, the ways in which they bubble to the surface and displace other possibilities for solidarity.
Understanding the New Syria: The View from the Diaspora
Lindsay Gifford
Since the start of the Syrian War, over half of the Syrian population has been displaced. At least ten million Syrians are currently estimated to live outside their home country, scattered around the world, from neighboring Middle Eastern states to every major continent. In the diaspora, Syrians have deployed various strategies to envision, plan, and shape their futures. These range from distancing themselves from previous traumas in their homeland to intensive engagement with the Syrian crisis; working with the regime, the opposition, and other refugees; and making plans to rebuild their country socially, politically, and economically post-war. Based on discussions with members of the Syrian diaspora – many of whom view themselves as aadi or "regular"– as well as studies and media reports, this talk addresses how those displaced from Syria are envisioning their future. In what ways has the diaspora engaged with the ongoing Syrian crisis, and to what effect? What outcomes do members of the diaspora hope to see as the conflict draws down? What should become of Bashar al-Assad and the regime as the state re-consolidates? Will displaced Syrians return, and under what conditions? Regular Syrians, who have often lacked access to power and resources in Syria, constitute part of a large-scale migration phenomenon that is worldwide in scope. They will play an important role in establishing a new Syria, with repercussions for the international, as well as their own, community.
Reconfiguring Authority: State and Informal Actors in Iraq
Harith Hasan al-Qarawee
The devolution of some of the Iraqi state's functions since the 1990’s, and the collapse of the Iraqi state after the U.S. occupation in 2003, have generated new power struggles. Two parallel dynamics have influenced and largely shaped those struggles: first, a new state-building process that was conceptually and institutionally framed by the consociational paradigm and liberal principles, and, second, the emergence of informal and non-state actors enabled by religious, sectarian and tribal/clan solidarities. In a context of a power vacuum, violent conflict, and societal division, attempts to re-articulate new modes of relations between the FORMAL and the INFORMAL became an essential factor in reconfiguring authority emerging in post-Baath (and post-ISIS) Iraq. This paper identifies some aspects of these reconfigurations by examining the transformations in relations between the state and Shiʻi clerical authority/actors in the last three decades.
Panel 5. REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION IN THE NEW MIDDLE EAST
International Law and the "New Middle East"
Aslı Bâli
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is often thought of as exceptional from the perspective of international law: there is no regional institutional comparable to those in Europe, the Americas and Africa; the region has low participation in the core multilateral agreements that make up the fabric of the international legal order; and normative changes such as international environmental and labor protections have had limited impact in the region. Yet in truth the MENA is both deeply penetrated by international law framings and increasingly significant in reshaping the core attributes of the international legal order. In particular, in the post-Cold War era, the region has become a laboratory for new international law paradigms such punitive multilateral sanctions regimes for arms control purposes; militarized conceptions of human rights that loosen the legal norm of non-intervention at the core of the United Nations sovereignty order; and novel rules of engagement under the laws of armed conflict for unilateral strikes against non-state actors or on other grounds. In this paper, I examine four episodes—the 2003 Iraq war; the 2011 Libya intervention; the strikes against Syria in 2013 and 2017; and the war in Yemen—to reveal the degree to which the region has come to serve as a zone of international legal innovation, experimentation and exception.
Into the Unknown: Turkish Foreign Policy under President Erdogan
Henri Barkey
During the first decade of the twenty-first century, Turkey had assumed an important and visible role in regional affairs, thanks to some skillful planning, placement, and luck. The accomplishments of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) were feted even in Europe and elsewhere. Turkey, it seemed, could even cower leaders in the Middle East with its widespread popular appeal. The heyday of Turkish diplomacy seems now to be in the past. The realities on the ground and Ankara's current narrative have increasingly become contradictory. On Syria, Russia, and the Gulf, Turkey has either had to execute a turnabout in policy or has found itself isolated and ignored by local partners that perceive it as being far too demanding and ideological. Yet the Turkish press is replete with stories of Turkish leadership in the Middle East and beyond. A supplicant press corps dutifully reports and praises Ankara's importance in all matters that influence regional or even international affairs. As Turkey has transitioned towards a personalized one-man political system under Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkish foreign and domestic policy preferences have become synonymous with his predilections and requirements. To be sure, there are long-standing interests, some archaic and some vital, that all Turkish governments have pursued. Still, Turkish domestic politics is casting a long shadow on the country's role in the region and beyond, as well as on Turkey's competition with other states, be they in the Gulf, North Africa or the Levant. This degree of personalization of foreign policy in Turkey is new. In the near term, this will translate into policy making that is simultaneously fast moving, changing, and yet prone to mistakes. Its long-term consequences are far more difficult to discern at this stage.
The Middle East Regional Crisis
Gregory Gause
The current crisis in the Middle East is frequently portrayed as a sectarian struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia for regional influence. While that is part of it, the causes of the crisis are to be found in the weakening or collapse of state authority in so many Arab countries. Civil conflicts open up these countries to outside influence, as the various parties to those conflicts invite outsiders into their politics-not only Iran and Saudi Arabia, but also Turkey, Qatar, the UAE, the United States, and others. Civil conflicts also exacerbate sectarian and other tensions in those societies, making conflict resolution that much more difficult. The struggle to achieve a balance of power in the Middle East is only understandable in light of the weakening of state authority across the region.
Panel 6. HUMAN SECURITY IN THE NEW MIDDLE EAST
Economic Dislocations in a Shifting Urban Geography: Insights from Amman, Jordan
Jillian Schwedler
Debates about human security often rightfully draw attention to questions of climate change, displaced persons, the spread of poverty, and the availability of adequate food, healthcare, and shelter. This paper explores an aspect of human security associated with the uneven geographies of urban space and the concomitant ways in which state-led projects of urban renewal – even those intended to improve human security – often lead to the prioritization of projects that exacerbate the plight of poor and working-class citizens. The regime of Jordan’s King Abdullah II has prioritized neoliberal projects in Amman aimed at attracting foreign capital and creating desirable, upscale urban spaces of the sort necessary to that capital. The regime has not ignored middle- and working-class neighborhoods, yet many of these projects have resulted in the destruction of local markets and communities in favor of more expensive international supermarkets and transit infrastructure intended to move citizens quickly around the city. This paper combines careful study of economic indicators for the city over the past decade with an original ethnographic examination of several changing urban spaces in Amman in order to highlight the ways in which certain projects improve human security for some segments of the population while simultaneously worsening life chances for others. A key piece of this picture entails examination of the flows of refugees into the capital city since 2004. Iraqi and Syrian populations have settled in various locations across the city and have no intention of leaving, placing significant strains on local services and infrastructure and exacerbating tensions among residents and communities. This paper explores a geography of inequality shaped by the dynamic urban renewal projects advanced by the regime.
Human Insecurity and Political Change
Marina Ottoway
Human insecurity has been the default situation in the Middle East and North Africa throughout history, as it has been in the rest of the world. Concern with human security, and the concomitant assumption that human beings are entitled to be secure, is an assumption rooted in the values of affluent liberal western welfare states, rather than a reflection of reality. The author of this paper shares those values and believes not only that human security is something states should strive to promote for their citizens, but that the international community should help bring about when states fail to do so. Nevertheless, to use the issue of human security as an analytical framework to help explain the configuration and reconfiguration of political power in the Middle East is a serious error, because human insecurity is a constant condition. The author discusses the difficulty of establishing links between the lack of human security and political events, which makes political predictions based on the status of human security difficult. She draws on decades of efforts by scholars and government agencies to develop indexes allowing them to predict political upheavals.
Education and Human Security: MENA Realities and Prognoses
Laurie Brand
This paper argues for the centrality of education in any evaluation of the region's future prospects, highlighting the many ways that educational access and attainment are hampered, challenged, or threatened by the current constellation of socio-economic and political factors in the region. The pairing of education with security is meant to underline the urgency of dealing with what has been, in some cases, a secular decline in this critical sector. This paper also expands upon the myriad ways that access to education has been impaired, thus emphasizing the multi-stranded nature of the dysfunction and malaise.
Exploring the Egyptian Revolution and Health Politics through Comics: The Making of “Lissa:” an ethnoGRAPHIC Story
Sherine Hamdy
In this paper, the author discusses her move from medical anthropological research to working on creating a graphic novel featuring women from extraordinarily different circumstances, each facing a medical decision the other can't understand. Lissa, which takes place against the backdrop of Egypt's popular uprising, is informed by Hamdy's ethnographic research in Egypt on the vulnerabilities that expose people to kidney and liver disease and the difficulties of accessing proper treatment. The work also draws on Coleman Nye's research in the United States on the social and political calculus of managing genetic risk for breast and ovarian cancer within a commercial healthcare system. This graphic work of "ethnofiction" tells the story of an unlikely friendship between Anna, the daughter of an America oil company executive living in Cairo who has a family history of breast cancer, and Layla, the daughter of the bawab of Anna's apartment building, who grows up to become a resolute physician struggling for better public health justice and rights in Egypt. Following the women as they grow up together and grapple with difficult medical decisions, the project explores how different people come to terms with illness and mortality against the backdrop of political, economic, and environmental crises.