At a recent Y&S Nazarian Center event, Prof. David Menashri discussed the recent nuclear deal with Iran, the role of Islamic ideology in Iranian policy and contemporary domestic politics in the country

“Iran is a very complex country — there is no black and white. There is no one face of Iran.”

By Peggy McInerny, Director of Communications

UCLA International Institute, March 17, 2016 — In a sweeping look at recent political developments in Iran, Tel Aviv University Professor Emeritus David Menashri claimed that internal domestic concerns largely drove its external policy and emphasized the strength of the country’s dynamic civil society. Its future, he argued, lies in the hands of its young people.

Menashri is senior research fellow at the Alliance Center for Iranian Studies and the Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University; he is currently the Israel Institute Visiting Professor at the UCLA Younes & Soraya Nazarian Center for Israel Studies. He spoke on Wednesday, February 24, at a Nazarian Center event cosponsored by the Burkle Center for International Relations, the Academic Programs of the UCLA International Institute and the Center for Middle East Development. Benjamin Radd (UCLA Ph.D. 2015), lecturer in public law and political science at the UCLA, moderated the event.

Nuclear deal

Menashri doubted that the recent nuclear deal would bring Iran closer to the United States very soon.* It would, however, enable Iran to pursue its immediate priority —developing commercial ties with the European Union — even if that means delaying its nuclear plan. “Iran has thus made a tactical retreat to get a strategic gain,” he said.

The country may have agreed to negotiate with the “Great Satan,” he explained, but implementation of the agreement will lift U.N. sanctions and help Iran recover billions of dollars. Moreover, he added, it will delay its military nuclear program only by 10 or 15 years. “Today,” he said, “Iranians feel confident, powerful and successful.” Iran’s position in the region has in addition been strengthened by its (and Russia’s) involvement in the Syrian civil war, which has strengthened the position of their ally, President Bashar al-Assad. The principal domestic danger now facing the Islamic Republic, he warned, is that of rising expectations.

The speaker argued that Iran had gained the most from the deal, which ended its painful diplomatic isolation and gives it the opportunity to improve its deteriorating economy. Menashri asserted that the agreement became possible primarily because the United States changed its position, declining to insist that Iran rein in its support for extremist groups or improve political freedoms and human rights conduct at home. Furthermore, he noted that Iran had been the direct beneficiary of U.S. policies in Iraq and Afghanistan, where American-led coalition troops toppled the Taliban (2002) and removed Saddam Hussein (2003). “Iran has been unable to export revolution, but it has stepped into the vacuum created by the destruction of these two previous enemies,” he observed.

In Menashri’s view, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei empowered President Hassan Rouhani to negotiate a nuclear agreement and only a nuclear agreement. The scholar believed it likely that Khamenei assured the radical conservatives that they would continue to control strategic and economic affairs in Iran after a nuclear deal was concluded. So it should come as no surprise that ideological attacks on the U.S. continue apace. “They are sticking with anti-Americanism because conservatives have withdrawn from so many of their dogmatic revolutionary ideals already,” said Menashri. “To drop that would be to admit defeat.”

Iran and the 1979 revolution: Distinguishing Islamic and national elements

“Iran is a very complex country — there is no black and white. There is no one face of Iran,” asserted the speaker. Pointing to its constitutional revolution of 1906 and the Islamic revolution of 1979, he observed, “Iran is the only country in the Middle East that has the tradition of popular upheavals, popular revolutions and changes of policy by popular uprisings.”

He argued that the 1979 revolution had not sought to return the country to the 7th century, but rather, to achieve the goals of social justice, political justice and respect. Therefore, in his view, final stabilization of the Islamic regime is not dependent on the degree of its return to Islam but rather, on the degree to which it answers the grievances of its young people and their search for liberty and welfare. These aspirations have not yet materialized, he observes. “[The regime] has been much more successful in returning to the people of Iran dignity, respect and national pride,” he observed.

Although the 1979 revolution brought about an Islamic regime, Menashri claimed that in its roots, it was not necessarily an Islamic revolution per se. Even if one argues that the regime is driven by Islamic ideology, it is impossible to define what that ideology means because there are so many interpretations of Islam, he said, many of which conflict with one another. Even an Islamic regime cannot tell you, a leading Iranian intellectual has observed, “This is the only way to understand Islam.”

When Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned to Iran victorious in February 1979, continued the speaker, there were seven grand ayatollahs in the country. None fully identified with Khomeini’s philosophy. Recently, even the grandson of Khomeini was disqualified as an electoral candidate for the Council of [theologian] Experts because he did not conform to the regime’s view of Islam. Moreover, he added, there has always been a degree of pluralism among the Shiite clerics of Iran.

As for the role of Islamic ideology in Iranian policy, Menashri commented, “From the first day of the Islamic revolution, there [has been] a constant deviation from dogmatic principles in favor of the national interests of the state and of the interests of the ruling elite.”

Iranian domestic politics today

The real division among political groups in Iran is how much they can deviate from dogma, in what area and at what rate, said the speaker. He identified the two major camps in the country as reformist-pragmatic-moderate and radical-traditionalist-conservative (with numerous subdivisions among each), noting that the latter camp controlled major policy decisions.

Menashri emphasized that the competition between these two groups is occurring within a vibrant civil society distinguished by an active women’s rights movement, a wonderful film industry, and a press that, “when allowed to publish, is fascinating to read.” When a colleague challenged his assertion some 15 years ago that relative freedom of expression then existed in Iran, noting that 100 newspapers had been closed in the previous five years, Menashri said he responded, “Show me another country in the Middle East that has 100 liberal newspapers that can be shut down.”

The scholar pointed out that many interesting books are also published in Iran, such as one in 2010 entitled A Fascist Interpretation of Religion and the State  (i.e., the Islamic regime of Iran) – a publication than went to several editions over the course of a few months. “Of course,” he observed sardonically, “the writer went to jail.” Menashri went on to quote an Iranian colleague: “They say we don’t have freedom of expression. That’s not true. We have freedom of expression — what we don’t have is freedom after expression.”

Professor David Menashri with moderator Ben Radd (UCLA Ph.D. 2015), UCLA lecturer in
public law and political science. (Photo: Peggy McInerny/ UCLA.)

According to the speaker, the power of the radicals/conservatives in Iran is attributable to three main things: they speak in the name of faith, they control the country’s might (i.e., the Revolutionary Guards and the military), and they have the will to fight for their survival. “The clerics did not [gain] power in Iran to give it up voluntarily,” he observed. Yet he pointed out that many ultra-radicals of the 1980s, including former and current presidents Khatami and Rouhani, respectively, have become reformists/pragmatists over time. “Not only do revolutions change, but people also adjust themselves to new realities,” he commented.

Despite the enormous attempt to disadvantage the chances of reformers in the national parliamentary elections of February 26 — only 30 out of 3,000 reformist candidates (1 percent) were approved by the Council of Guardians — Menashri said the elections count. President Rouhani, he explained, has fulfilled his election promises to return to Iranians the value of their passports (dignity) and the value of their currency (the promise of economic betterment). Although people do not expect immediate improvements in political freedoms, he claimed that they do expect an improvement in economic conditions. The elections, he cautioned, would be an indication if Rouhani can deliver on those expectations.

Menashri explained that the pragmatists in the regime decided not to boycott the elections, but to vote against a specific list of the most prominent radical candidates standing for election. “If they are able to kick out the leading radicals from parliament,” he said, “this will be warning sign by the people [to the regime] — like a yellow card in soccer.” Their failure to be elected will preclude their appointment to the Council of Experts, he explained, which will one day be charged with naming the next Supreme Leader. (The electoral strategy proved very successful in the elections, which occurred two days after Menashri’s lecture.)

Future is in the hands of Iran’s youth

The key to change in Iran lies in its young people, said Menashri. “Seventy years ago, there was not a single girl in Iranian university. Today, 60-something percent of university students are female.” Overall, he added, the number of university students has risen greatly under the Islamic regime and the students are not happy with current conditions. This social change is hard to reverse.

“Change will come to Iran when young people will take responsibility for the future and lead the change,” he said. “We don’t know when this will happen. . . . No one knows when one day people wake up and start changing history.” Claiming that the radicals in Iran are leading against the desires of their people and their aspirations, Menashri asserted, “Either they will change their policies and lead these young people toward a better life in terms of social justice and political justice —or they risk the danger of running against the flow of traffic.”

For centuries, said the speaker, Iran was a country with two legacies: pre-Islamic Persian culture and its Islamic heritage. In the last 200 years, however, Menashri argued said that the West had become a third formidable influence. “Today, the Iranian state is based on three legs: Persian culture, Islamic tradition and the impact of two centuries of Western influence,” concluded Menashri. “I think that these three are inseparable.” While their relative share in the mix can be changed, he said, they can’t be separated.

* The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was agreed upon by Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States) on July 14, 2015.